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1 Introduction
There is a large literature on the composition of the boards as well as the monitoring role and
the advisory role of the boards. Nevertheless, the problem of collusion between the CEO and the
board has receive little attention. The aim of this paper is to study collusive aspects of the board
of directors. Our paper sheds light on the problem of composition of the board of directors. We
study what is the optimal composition of the board of directors in particular if it is preferable to
have a insider-oriented board or a outsider-oriented board with a majority of independent directors.
We consider that a board of independent directors that are all chosen directly by the CEO is a
friendly board if the independent directors follow the decision of the CEO. We study the case of
collusion considering a CEO facing a choice of projects. We propose a model where we have di¤erent
projects each with a certain level of risk. The choice of the best project for the company is function
of remuneration of the CEO as well as the private benets of the CEO.
2 The Model
2.1 The CEO and the Projects of the Company
A rm can undertake a project which yields an uncertain payo¤. The rm is run for the shareholders
by a CEO, i.e. the CEOs task is to select the project that will be undertaken by the rm.
The CEOs ability to succeed in the projects may be either low,  = ; with probability ()
or high,  =  with probability (1  ): As  corresponds to a low CEOs ability and  to a high
ability, we have    .
We assume that the rm can undertake two kinds of projects. The implementation of those
projects initially require a xed investment I by the rms shareholders. The characteriscs of those
projects are the following:
1
 Project 1 either succeeds, that is, yields veriable income R > 0 or fails, that is, yields no
income. The probability of success is denoted by (q1): Moreover, this project may have a low
probability of success, that is, q1 =piwith probability () or may have a high probability of
success q1 = pi with probability (1   ) where i 2

;
	
is the CEOs ability to succeed
in the projects.
 In the same way, Project 2 either succeeds, that is, yields veriable income R > 0 or fails,
that is, yields no income. The probability of success is denoted by (q2): Moreover, this project
may have a low probability of success, that is, q2 = (p   ")i with probability () or may
have a high probability of success q2 = (p+ ")i with probability (1  ) where i 2

;
	
is the CEOs ability to succeed in the projects.
The success and the failure of both projects are assumed to be perfectly correlated i.e. ()
represents the probability that the economic context is bad for yhe type of projects considered by
the rm while (") represents the relative volativity of project two compared to project one.
The CEO perfectly knows both her abilitys type and the probability of success of the projects
while shareholders only know their prior probability distribution.
The CEO may therefore send signals to shareholders about her type and the probability of
success of the selected project:8>>>>><>>>>>:
LL = (L;L),  =  and q2 = p  " (, q1 = p)
LH = (L;H),  =  and q2 = p+ " (, q1 = p)
HL = (H;L),  =  and q2 = p  " (, q1 = p)
HH = (H;H),  =  and q2 = p+ " (, q1 = p)
The CEOs compensation (paid by the rms shareholders) is composed by a xed part ij and
a variable part ij that depends on the prots from the project () where i 2 fL;Hg corresponds
to the CEOs signal about her ability (called hereafter the CEOs type) and j 2 fL;Hg corresponds
to the CEOs signal about the probability of success of the project (called hereafter the projects
type).
When Project 2 is selected while it has a low probability of success q2 = (p   "), the CEO
receives a private benet B which represents his private compensation for choosing a project that
poorly performs.
The CEOs reservation wage is w.
2.2 The Board of Directors
Shareholders also have the possibility to hire a Board. The Board has both a supervising and a
consulting job, i.e. he may have information about the type of the project and can communicate
it to shareholders but may also monitor the information communicated by the CEO.
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The structure of the Board is endogenous, in the sense that shareholders choose it. More par-
ticularly, shareholders can choose the degree of independence of the Board. Lower is this degree
of independence, more the Boards information about the type of the project is precise, but also
more the Board is prone to engage in collusion with the CEO, both due to his relationship with
the CEO and his executive role in the rm for instance.
We model the degree of independence of the board by a variable  2 [1;+1] that acts as a
discount factor for the collusions rents. When his degree of independence,  ; increases, the amount
of information hold by a Board decreases while his willingness to engage in collusion decreases.
Let () = 1 be t-he probability that a Board with a degree of independence  has gathered
the true information about the economic context.When  increases, Board members are more
independant and less prone to collusion. However, as they have less information about the rm,
their probability of knowing the truth is lower. We also assume that the CEO incurs a ne F
when the Board reveals to the shareholders that she has announced that the project has a high
probability of success while it is a project with a low probability of success, i.e. the case in which
she gets the bonus B.
We are particularly interested in determining the value of the degree of independence  such
that the Board is Independent i.e. is completely honest and never accepts to engage in collusion
with the CEO (this however means that he has a less precise information about the type of the
project).
When collusion takes place, we assume that the CEO shares the collusive prots with the Board.
The Boards wage is w0.
2.3 Multidimensional Screening Model
This model is a multidimensional screening model. Solving this kind of model is usually very
complex (see Rochet and Chone, 1998). However, the structure of the model allows us to reduce
this problems complexity in a usual unidimensional screening model as the CEOs objective only
depends on one parameter, ij ; that can be dened in the following way:8>>>>><>>>>>:
LL = p
LH = (p+ ")
HL = p
HH = (p+ ")
In this paper we assume that
 
p  "  (p+ "); i.e. a high ability CEO undertaking a
project with a low probability of success has more chances to succeed than a low ability CEO
undertaking a project with a high probability of success, this assumption put forward the positive
role of the CEO in his management of projects.
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The shareholders maximize their expected prots:
W = 
 
pR  I  LL   LL  pR  I
+(1  )  (p+ ")R  I  LH   LH  (p+ ")R  I
+(1  )  pR  I  HL   HL  pR  I
+(1  )(1  )  (p+ ")R  I  HH   HH  (p+ ")R  I
3 No Board
When they do not hire a Board of Directors, shareholders maximize their expected prots under
the usual Participation and Incentive constraints. PCij is the Participation constraint of a CEO
with ability i 2 fH;Lg when the project is of type j 2 fH;Lg. The Participation constraints
ensure that the CEO will earn at least her reservation wage w. ICij!kl is the Incentive constraint
of a CEO who reveals that her ability is k 2 fH;Lg and the project is of type l 2 fH;Lg while her
true ability is i and the true type of the project is j. The Incentives constraints ensure that the
CEO earns a higher wage revealing the truth than lying to the shareholders. Through this process,
shareholders induce the CEO to reveal his real type. Those constraints are stated here:
LL + LL

pR  I  w (PCLL)
LH + LH

(p+ ")R  I  w (PCLH)
HL + HL

pR  I  w (PCHL)
HH + HH

(p+ ")R  I  w (PCHH)
HH + HH

(p+ ")R  I  HL + HL pR  I (ICHH!HL)
HH + HH

(p+ ")R  I  LH + LH (p+ ")R  I (ICHH!LH)
HH + HH

(p+ ")R  I  LL + LL pR  I (ICHH!LL)
HL + HL

pR  I  HH + HH  p  "R  I+B (ICHL!HH)
HL + HL

pR  I  LH + LH  p  "R  I+B (ICHL!LH)
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HL + HL

pR  I  LL + LL pR  I (ICHL!LL)
LH + LH

(p+ ")R  I  HH + HH (p+ ")R  I (ICLH!HH)
LH + LH

(p+ ")R  I  HL + HL pR  I (ICLH!HL)
LH + LH

(p+ ")R  I  LL + LL pR  I (ICLH!LL)
LL + LL

pR  I  HH + HH  p  "R  I+B (ICLL!HH)
LL + LL

pR  I  HL + HL pR  I (ICLL!HL)
LL + LL

pR  I  LH + LH  p  "R  I+B (ICLL!LH)
Moreover, the Spence Mirrlees condition has to be satised, that is:
HH  HL  LH  LL
By assumption, we know that the following condition is satised: 
p  "   (p+ ")  0 (1)
As usual in this kind of problem, the binding constraints are1 :
LL + LL

pR  I = w (PCLL)
LH + LH

(p+ ")R  I = LL + LL pR  I (ICLH!LL)
= LL + LL

pR  I+ LLRp
= w + LLRp
HL + HL

pR  I = LH + LH  p  "R  I+B (ICHL!LH)
= LH + LH

(p+ ")R  I  LHR (p+ ")    p  "+B
= w + LLRp+ LHR

p   p   "   + +B
1We check that all constraints are satised in the Appendix.
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HH + HH

(p+ ")R  I = HL + HL pR  I (ICHH!HL)
= HL + HL

pR  I+ HLRp
= w + LLRp+ LHR

p   p   "   + + HLRp+B
The optimal contract when there is no Board in the rms organizaton is characterized in the
following Proposition:
Proposition 1 When they do not hire a Board of Directors, shareholders must conced the following
informational rents to a CEO
ULL = w
ULH = w
UHL = w +
B
 
p  "
 [p+ 2"]
UHH =
8><>:
w +
B(p ")p()2
[p+2"][p p] if "  "nb =
p
+
p
p
 
w + B(p+")[p+2"] if "  "nb
Moreover, the shareholdersexpected prots are
WNB =
8><>: E()  w  
(1 )B(p ")
(p+2")

 p+p
p p

if "  "nb
E()  w   (1  ) (p+ "  p  2") B(p+2") if "  "nb
A low ability CEO does not receive any rent whatever the type of project she advises to select.
However, when her signal pushes shareholders to select the project with the highest volatility
(Project 2), she receives a variable wage while she only gets a xed wage when shareholders are
induced to select Project 1.
A high ability CEO receives an informational rent which is higher when her signal induces
shareholders to select the project with the highest volatility (Project 2) than when shareholders
are induced to select Project 1. Moreover, the variable part of her wage is higher when project 2 is
nally selected than when it is Project 1. But, in all cases, the variable part of a high ability CEO
is higher that the one of a low ability CEO.
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4 No Collusion
In this section, we assume that collusion is not possible between the Board of Directors and the
CEO2.When shareholders hire a Board, the CEO may incur a loss F when the Board has found that
she has announced that the Project has a high probability of success while it is a low probability
of success project, i.e. the case in which she has the bonus B. The Participation and Incentive
constraints are now:
LL + LL

pR  I  w (PCLL)
LH + LH

(p+ ")R  I  w (PCLH)
HL + HL

pR  I  w (PCHL)
HH + HH

(p+ ")R  I  w (PCHH)
HH + HH

(p+ ")R  I  HL + HL pR  I (ICHH!HL)
HH + HH

(p+ ")R  I  LH + LH (p+ ")R  I (ICHH!LH)
HH + HH

(p+ ")R  I  LL + LL pR  I (ICHH!LL)
HL + HL

pR  I  (1  ())HH + HH  p  "R  I+B	+ () (w   F )
(ICHL!HH)
HL + HL

pR  I  (1  ())LH + LH  p  "R  I+B	+ () (w   F )
(ICHL!LH)
HL + HL

pR  I  LL + LL pR  I (ICHL!LL)
LH + LH

(p+ ")R  I  HH + HH (p+ ")R  I (ICLH!HH)
LH + LH

(p+ ")R  I  HL + HL pR  I (ICLH!HL)
2We examine the case of collusion in the next section.
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LH + LH

(p+ ")R  I  LL + LL pR  I (ICLH!LL)
LL + LL

pR  I  (1  ())HH + HH  p  "R  I+B	+ () (w   F )
(ICLL!HH)
LL + LL

pR  I  HL + HL pR  I (ICLL!HL)
LL+LL

pR  I  (1  ())LH + LH  p  "R  I+B	+() (w   F ) (ICLL!LH)
We also assume that the CEO faces a limited liability constraint, i.e., even if the Board found
that the CEO has sent the wrong signal, she cannot get less than her reservation wage. This gives:
(1  ()) fw +Bg+ () (w   F )  w (LL)
, B  ()
(1  ())F
The binding constraints are:
LL + LL

pR  I = w (PCLL)
LH + LH

(p+ ")R  I = LL + LL pR  I (ICLH!LL)
= LL + LL

pR  I+ LLRp
= w + LLRp
HL + HL

pR  I = (1  ())LH + LH  p  "R  I+B	+ () (w   F ) (ICHL!LH)
= (1  ())
(
LH + LH

(p+ ")R  I
 LHR

(p+ ")    p  "+B
)
+ () (w   F )
= (1  ())w + LLRp+ LHR p   p   "   + +B	+ () (w   F )
HH + HH

(p+ ")R  I = HL + HL pR  I (ICHH!HL)
= HL + HL

pR  I+ HLRp
= (1  ())w + LLRp+ LHR p   p   "   + +B	
+() (w   F ) + HLRp
The optimal contract when there is a Board of Director and when collusion is not achievable is
characterized in the following Proposition:
8
Proposition 2 When they hire a Board of Directors and when collusion is not possible, sharehold-
ers must concede the following informational rents to a CEO
ULL = w
ULH = w
UHL = w + (1  ())
 
p  "
0@
h
B   ()(1 ())F
i


(p+ ")   p  "
1A
UHH =
8><>:
w +
(p ")p()2[(1 ())B ()F ]
[p+2"][p p] if "  "ib =
p ()p
(1 ())+ p
p
 
w +
(p+")
h
B  ()
(1 ())F
i
[(p+") (p ")] if "  "ib
Moreover, the shareholdersexpected prots are
WIB =
8>><>>:
E()  w   w0   (1  )(1  ())(p  ")
h
B  ()
(1 ())F
i
(p+2")

 + (1  ) p
p p

if "  "ib
E()  w   w0   (1  )
h
B  ()
(1 ())F
i
(p+2")

(1  ())(p  ") + (1  )(p+ ") if "  "ib
In this case, the optimal contract has the same form than without Board, i.e. no rent for a low
ability CEO and a positive rent for a high ability CEO which is higher when Project 2 is selected
following her advice. However, we can note that the informational rents extracted by a CEO when
there is an a Board of Directors having no possibility to collude are lower than when there is no
Board whatever the CEOs type.
We can therefore immediately conclude that there exists a Boards wage fw0 such that for all
w0  fw0; hiring an a Board is always benecial for the shareholders when collusion is not possible,
i.e. WIB WNB for all w0  fw0:
5 Collusive Board
We now examine a framework in which the CEO and the Board of Directors may collude when this
is protable for them.
In the following inequalities, wL is the income of a board that announces that the project has
a low probability of success, wH is the income of a board that announces that the project has a
high probability of success, w; is the income of a board that announces that it has no information
regarding the project probability of success, w0 is the income of a board that says the truth, i.e.
an Independent Board.
The following constraints reveal that the CEO-Board coalition had better tell the truth than
collude with each other.
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 [ULL   w + wL] + (1  ) [UHL   w + wL]  

ULH   w

+ w;

+ (1  )

UHH   w

+ w;

, wL  

ULH   w

  (ULL   w)

+ (1  )

UHH   w

  (UHL   w)

+ w;
We set A = 
h
ULH w
   (ULL   w)
i
+ (1  )
h
UHH w
   (UHL   w)
i
 [ULH   w + wH ] + (1  ) [UHH   w + wH ]  

ULL   w

+ w;

+ (1  )

UHL   w

+ w;

, wH  

ULL   w

  (ULH   w)

+ (1  )

UHL   w

  (UHH   w)

+ w;
We set B = 
h
ULL w
   (ULH   w)
i
+ (1  )
h
UHL w
   (UHH   w)
i
Since we have ULL  ULH  UHL  UHH and   1, necessarily B  0.
We then have 4 constraints to satify:
wL  A+ w; (1)
wH  B + w; (2)
wL  w0 (3)
wH  w0 (4)
5.1 Collusion-Proof contract
In this situation, shareholders want to avoid collusion in the Board. The only case they have to
take into account is when the Board says there is a low probablity of success (the Board is more
likely to lie when the project is of a low probability of success ; there is no point in lying when it is
of a high probability of success): therefore we will always have wL  wH . They can try to use wL
to pay the Board into revealing the truth: if they set wL high enough, collusion might be avoided.
The shareholdersexpected prots have the following form:
WCP = E()  ULL    (1  )ULH   (1  ) UHL   (1  ) (1  )UHH
 ()wL   (1  ) ()wH   (1  ())w0
In that case, the constraint on wL is binding. Since they want to maximize their income,
shareholders set wH = w; = w0 (because w0 is the lowest wage of the board).
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wL = 

ULH   w

  (ULL   w)

+ (1  )

UHH   w

  (UHL   w)

+ w;
= 

ULH   ULL

+
1  

(ULL   w)

+ (1  )

UHH   UHL

+
1  

(UHL   w)

+ w;
wH = w; = w0
We can remark that there exists 0 such that wL  w0 ()   0: This means that for   0,
engaging in collusion is not benecial for the coalition Board-CEO and the optimal contract is the
same as with an Independent Board. Actually, when   0, the Board will not collude whatsoever
happens. Shareholders dont need to induce the Board to say the truth because he will do it anyway.
So, we have in this case
wL = wH = w0
We are now characterizing 0
wL  w0 ()  [ (ULL   w) + (1  ) (UHL   w)]   (ULH   w) + (1  ) (UHH   w)
()   UHH   w
UHL   w
0 =
8<:
1
1 ()
p+"
p " if "  "ib
p
p p if "  "ib
However, on the interval [1; 0], since shareholders have paid enough to avoid collusion, the CEOs
rents are those of an Independent Board. For those degree of independence, since shareholders have
paid enough to avoid collusion, the CEOs rents are those of an Independent Board:
ULL = w
ULH = w
UHL = w + (1  ())
 
p  "
0@
h
B   ()(1 ())F
i


(p+ ")   p  "
1A
UHH =
8><>:
w +
(p ")p()2[(1 ())B ()F ]
[p+2"][p p] if "  "ib
w +
(p+")
h
B  ()
(1 ())F
i
[(p+") (p ")] if "  "ib
This is stated in the following Proposition.
Proposition 3 Assume that collusion between the Board of Directors and the CEO is possible. In
the optimal collusion proof contract, when they hire a Board of Directors, shareholders must concede
the same rents to a CEO than in the presence of an Independent Board.
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In this case, the shareholdersexpected prots are
WCP =
8>><>>:
E()  w   w0   (1  )(1  ())(p  ")
h
B  ()
(1 ())F
i
(p+2")

(1  ()) + (1   + () ) pp p

if "  "ib
E()  w   w0   (1  )
h
B  ()
(1 ())F
i
(p+2")
h
(1  ())2(p  ") + (1   + () )(p+ ")
i
if "  "ib
Moreover, there exists 0 such that for Boards of Directors with a degree of independence   0,
it is not benecial to engage in collusion.
5.2 Collusion Free contract
We now characterize the optimal collusion free contract. In this case, shareholders would have to
pay too much to avoid collusion, they therefore decide to let it happen because they would throw
money out of the window if they paid the board. The shareholders expected prots have the
following form:
WCF = E()  ULL    (1  )ULH   (1  ) UHL   (1  ) (1  )UHH
 ()wL   (1  ) ()wH   (1  ())w;
This is optimal to set wL = w0. Inequalities (1) and (2) do not need to be satised. Subsequently,
we have:
wL = wH = w; = w0
Since the Board is collusive, shareholders should not trust what it says for their own good.
Therefore, the CEOs rents are those of a No Board case.
ULL = w
ULH = w
UHL = w +
B
 
p  "
 [p+ 2"]
UHH =
8<: w +
B(p ")p()2
[p+2"][p p] if "  "nb
w + B(p+")[p+2"] if "  "nb
Proposition 4 Assume that collusion between the Board of Directors and the CEO is possible. In
the optimal collusion free contract, when they hire a Board of Directors, shareholders must concede
the same rents to a CEO than without any Board.
In this case, the shareholdersexpected prots are
WCF =
8><>: E()  w0   w   (1  )

 + (1  ) p
p p

B(p ")
(p+2") if "  "nb
E()  w0   w   (1  ) [(p+ ")  (p+ 2")] B(p+2") if "  "nb
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5.3 Optimal Contract with collusion
Lets remind that () = 1 .
In order to nd the optimal contract in presence of collusion, WCB; we have to compare WCP
and WCF and to nd which one is the highest depending on  . Indeed, the shareholders will choose
to design the contract (Collusion Proof or Collusion Free) in order to maximize their objective. As
"ib  "nb we only have three cases:
1. "  "ib
2. "ib  "  "nb
3. "nb  "
The following Proposition characterizes the optimal contract when collusion is achievable.
Proposition 5 For all  2 [1; 0] ; the optimal contract is the collusion proof contract for all ".
This allows us to state that the shareholderss welfare, WCB that depends on  is, for all
 2 [1; 0] :
WCB() = max(WCP ;WCF ) =WCP ()
This is an important result as it means that when collusion is achievable and is protable fot the
coalition Board/CEO, it is benecial for the shareholders to o¤er a contract preventing collusion
to emerge. However, this is costly in terms of informational rents.
This result and those of the previopus sections allow us to characterize what is the optimal
structure of teh Board of Directors from the shareholdersperspective.
6 Optimal Structure of the Board
We are now able to nd what is the optimal Boards degree of independence  maximizing the
piecewise continuous shareholderss welfare WCB():
We have to take care about corner solutions as  2 [1; 0] :
In order to simplify the computations, we rewrite the intervals of discontinuity of WCB() in
order to build them with repect to  : This gives
"  "ib =
pp  1 pp
( 1)
 p+ p   p
,  
p
[p p]
p
[p p]  
(p+")
(p ")
= b
Hence, when

p
[p p]  
(p+")
(p ")

 0; () "  pp
p+[p p] = b";
"  "ib for all 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and when

p
[p p]  
(p+")
(p ")

 0; () "  pp
p+[p p] = b";
"  "ib for   b ; and
"  "ib for   b
The shareholders thus have the following objective function3:
When "  b";
WCB() =
8>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>:
E()  w   w0
 (1  ) [B 
1
 1F ]
(p+2")
"
(  1 )
2(p  ")
+(1   + 
2
)(p+ ")
#
if   b
E()  w   w0
 (1  )(  1 )(p  ")
[B  1 1F ]
(p+2")
24 (  1 )
+(1   + 
2
) p
p p
35 if b    0
E()  w   w0
 (1  )(  1 )(p  ")
[B  1 1F ]
(p+2")

 + (1  ) p
p p

if   0
When "  b";
WCB() =
8>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>:
E()  w   w0
 (1  ) [B 
1
 1F ]
(p+2")
"
(  1 )
2(p  ")
+(1   + 
2
)(p+ ")
#
if   0
E()  w   w0
 (1  ) [B 
1
 1F ]
(p+2")

(  1 )(p  ") + (1  )(p+ ")

if   0
Lemma 6 WCB() is non increasing on each interval of discontinuity.
This allows us to compute the Boards optimal degree of independence, :
As WCB() is non increasing on each interval, we have to compare its value for the lower bound
of each interval4.
The following proposition summarizes our results:
Proposition 7 When "  b"; min  min and 0  0; it is optimal for the shareholders to select a
Board of Directors with a low degree of independence, i.e.  = min and to o¤er contracts avoiding
collusion between the Board and the CEO.
In all other cases, it is optimal for the shareholders to select a Board of Directors with a high
degree of independence, i.e.  = 0. In this case, the shareholders should not care about collusion
because collusion is not protable for such Boards.
3As b  0 8"
4Assuming that min is such that
h
B   1
min 1F
i
= K > 0:
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Contrary to the usual idea that the optimal Board should be independant, we nd that share-
holders may prefer to select a Board of Directors with a low degree of independence. However,
the result is not due, as in Adams and Ferreira (2007), to the fact that the CEO is more prone
to reveal information to a "friendly" Board. Here, there is a trade-o¤ between the information
that shareholders may extract from the Board and the costs from both extracting it and avoiding
collusion. When the risk of both projects are close, when there are constraints (ethical or technical)
on the level of collusion that can be sustained and when the degree of independence necessary to
have a perfectly honest Board is too high, the optimal structure is a Board with a low degree of
independence. However, when project 2 is too risky compared to project 1 or when collusion is not
too costly for the coalition or when he degree of independence necessary to have a perfectly honest
Board is low enough, the optimal structure is a Board with a high degree of independence and the
shareholders should not care about collusion because collusion is not protable for such Boards.
6.1 Camparative statics
We now have to nd what are the e¤ects of B;F; ; p; p; ; ; " on the optimal : In particular, it
would be interesting to know how the region of parameters such that a Board with a low degree of
independence is optimal varies when those parameters vary.
When BF is high (i.e. B high or F low), the optimal  seems to be 
 = min (conversely, when
B
F is low , 
 = 0)
When " is high, the optimal  is  = 0 (conversely, when " is low ,  = min)
7 Conclusion
8 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. When they do not hire a Board of Directors, shareholders maximize
their expected prots under the usual Participation and Incentive constraints. PCij is the Partic-
ipation constraint of a CEO with ability i 2 fH;Lg when the project is of type j 2 fH;Lg. The
Participation constraints ensure that the CEO will earn at least her reservation wage w. ICij!kl
is the Incentive constraint of a CEO who reveals that her ability is k 2 fH;Lg and the project
is of type l 2 fH;Lg while her true ability is i and the true type of the project is j. The Incen-
tives constraints ensure that the CEO earns a higher wage revealing the truth than lying to the
shareholders. Through this process, shareholders induce the CEO to reveal his real type. Those
constraints are stated here:
LL + LL

pR  I  w (PCLL)
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LH + LH

(p+ ")R  I  w (PCLH)
HL + HL

pR  I  w (PCHL)
HH + HH

(p+ ")R  I  w (PCHH)
HH + HH

(p+ ")R  I  HL + HL pR  I (ICHH!HL)
HH + HH

(p+ ")R  I  LH + LH (p+ ")R  I (ICHH!LH)
HH + HH

(p+ ")R  I  LL + LL pR  I (ICHH!LL)
HL + HL

pR  I  HH + HH  p  "R  I+B (ICHL!HH)
HL + HL

pR  I  LH + LH  p  "R  I+B (ICHL!LH)
HL + HL

pR  I  LL + LL pR  I (ICHL!LL)
LH + LH

(p+ ")R  I  HH + HH (p+ ")R  I (ICLH!HH)
LH + LH

(p+ ")R  I  HL + HL pR  I (ICLH!HL)
LH + LH

(p+ ")R  I  LL + LL pR  I (ICLH!LL)
LL + LL

pR  I  HH + HH  p  "R  I+B (ICLL!HH)
LL + LL

pR  I  HL + HL pR  I (ICLL!HL)
LL + LL

pR  I  LH + LH  p  "R  I+B (ICLL!LH)
Moreover, the Spence Mirrlees condition has to be satised, that is:
HH  HL  LH  LL
By assumption, we know that (1) is satised: 
p  "   (p+ ")  0
As usual in this kind of problem, the binding constraints are :
LL + LL

pR  I = w (PCLL)
LH + LH

(p+ ")R  I = LL + LL pR  I (ICLH!LL)
= LL + LL

pR  I+ LLRp
= w + LLRp
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HL + HL

pR  I = LH + LH  p  "R  I+B (ICHL!LH)
= LH + LH

(p+ ")R  I  LHR (p+ ")    p  "+B
= w + LLRp+ LHR

p   p   "   + +B
HH + HH

(p+ ")R  I = HL + HL pR  I (ICHH!HL)
= HL + HL

pR  I+ HLRp
= w + LLRp+ LHR

p   p   "   + + HLRp+B
In order to minimize the CEOs informational rents, shareholders set LL; LH and HL as low
as possible while satisfying the other Incentive constraints.
We now check what are the conditions due to the other Incentive constraints (and will check
later that Participation constraints are satised). There is no constraint on LL; we can therefore
set:
LL = 0
LL + LL

pR  I  LH + LH  p  "R  I+B = (ICLL!LH)
LH + LH

(p+ ")R  I  LHR (p+ ")   p  "+B
, w  w + LLRp  LHR [p+ 2"] +B
, LHR [p+ 2"]  B
, LH 
B
R [p+ 2"]
and then
LH =
B
R [p+ 2"]
HH + HH

(p+ ")R  I  LL + LL pR  I = w + LLR p   p (ICHH!LL)
, w + LLRp+ LHR

p   p   "   + + HLRp+B  w + LLR p   p
,  LLR [p] + LHR

p   p   "   + + HLRp+B  0
, LHR

p   p   "   + + HLRp+B  0
which is satised, as

p   p   "   +   0:
HL + HL

pR  I  LL + LL pR  I = w + LLRp (ICHL!LL)
, w + LLRp+ LHR

p   p   "   + +B  w + LLRp
, LHR

p   p   "   +   LLR p   p+B  0
, LHR

p   p   "   + +B  0
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As

p   p   "   +   0; (ICHL!LL) is not binding.
LH + LH

(p+ ")R  I  HH + HH (p+ ")R  I (ICLH!HH)
= HH + HH

(p+ ")R  I  HHR (p+ ")
, w + LLRp  w + LLRp+ LHR

p   p   "   + 
+HLRp+B   HHR (p+ ")
, HHR (p+ ")  LHR

p   p   "   + + HLRp+B
, HHR (p+ ")   LHR

p   p   "   +   HLRp B  0
, HHR (p+ ") 
B
 [p+ 2"]

p   p   "   + + B [p+ 2"]
 [p+ 2"]
, HHR (p+ ") 
B
 [p+ 2"]

p   p   "   + + p   p + 2"
, HHR (p+ ") 
B (p+ ")
 [p+ 2"]
, HH 
B
R [p+ 2"]
= LH :
This is satised from the Spence Mirlees condition.
LH + LH

(p+ ")R  I  HL + HL pR  I = HL + HL pR  I  HLR p   p
(ICLH!HL)
, w + LLRp  w + LLRp+ LHR

p   p   "   +   HLR p   p+B
, HLR

p   p  LHR p   p   "   + +B
, HLR

p   p  B p  "
 [p+ 2"]
, HL 
B

p  "
R [p+ 2"]

p   p = 1HL
HH + HH

(p+ ")R  I  LH + LH (p+ ")R  I = w + LLRp+ LHR (p+ ")
(ICHH!LH)
, w + LLRp+ LHR

p   p   "   + + HLRp+B  w + LLRp+ LHR (p+ ")
, LHR

p   p   p+ p   " + "   "   + + HLRp+B  0
, HLRp  LHR [p+ 2"] +B  0
, HL 
B
Rp
= 2HL
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LL + LL

pR  I  HL + HL pR  I = HL + HL pR  I  HLRp
(ICLL!HL)
, w  w + LLRp+ LHR

p   p   "   +   HLRp +B
, 0  LLRp+ LHR

p   p   "   +   HLRp +B
HLRp 
BR

p   p   "   + 
R [p+ 2"]
+B
HLRp 
B
 
p  "
 [p+ 2"]
HL 
B
 
p  "
Rp [p+ 2"]
This is always veried as
B(p ")
R[p+2"]p  LH and due to the Spence Mirlees condition.
LL + LL

pR  I  LH + LH  p  "R  I+B = (ICLL!LH)
LH + LH

(p+ ")R  I  LHR (p+ ")   p  "+B
, w  w + LLRp  LHR [p+ 2"] +B
(ICLL!LH) is thus not binding
HL + HL

pR  I  HH + HH  p  "R  I+B (ICHL!HH)
= w + LLRp+ LHR

p   p   "   + + HLRp  HHR [p+ 2"] + 2B
, w + LLRp+ LHR

p   p   "   + +B  w + LLRp+ LHR p   p   "   + 
+HLRp  HHR [p+ 2"] + 2B
, HHR [p+ 2"]  HLRp+B
, HH 
B

p  "
R [p+ 2"]2

p   pp+ BR [p+ 2"] = 1HH
LL + LL

pR  I  HH + HH  p  "R  I+B = (ICLL!HH)
HH + HH

(p+ ")R  I  HHR (p+ ")    p  "+B
, w  w + LLRp+ LHR

p   p   "   + + HLRp  HHR  p   p+ "   + + 2B
, HH 
LH
[p p "(+)]
[(p p)+"(+)]
+HL
p
[(p p)+"(+)]
+ 2B
R[(p p)+"(+)]
= 2HH
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We therefore have:
LL = 0
LH =
B
R [p+ 2"]
HL = max

LH ;
1
HL;
2
HL
	
HH  max

HL;
1
HH ;
2
HH
	
We now have to show that HL =
8><>:
1HL if 
p
+
p
p
  = "nb
2HL if " 
p
+
p
p
  = "nb
We only have six cases:
1. LH  1HL  2HL () HL = 2HL if "  p  "
h
 +
p
p   
i
: Indeed, we have :
LH  1HL  2HL ()
1
p+ 2"

 
p  "
(p+ 2")
 
p   p  p
()
(
p   p   p  " 
p  "p  (p+ 2")  p   p
()
(
"  p
 "p   pp   2"p + 2"p
()
(
"  p
pp  "  p   2p + p
()
8<: "  pp  " +  pp   
For the following cases (2, 3 and 4), we use the same inequalities to obtain.
2. 1HL  LH  2HL () HL = 2HL if p  "
3. LH  2HL  1HL () HL = 1HL if "
h
 +
p
p   
i
 p  2"
4. 2HL  LH  1HL () HL = 1HL if p  2"
5. 2HL  1HL  LH () impossible. Indeed, we would eventually obtain
"  p  "

 + 
p
p
  

which is not possible because the last term is strictly superior to the rst one.
6. 1HL  2HL  LH () impossible
We therefore have the result of the lemma.
And then :
ULL = LL + LL

pR  I = w
ULH = LH + LH

(p+ ")R  I = w + LLRp = w
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UHL = HL + HL

pR  I = w + B p   p   "   + 
 [p+ 2"]
+B
() UHL = w +
B
 
p  "
 [p+ 2"]
Moreover, when "  p
+
p
p
  = "nb
UHH = HH + HH

(p+ ")R  I = w + B  p  "
 [p+ 2"]
+
B

p  "p
 [p+ 2"]

p   p
= w +
B
 
p  " p   p+ p
 [p+ 2"]

p   p
() UHH = w +
B
 
p  " p ()2
 [p+ 2"]

p   p
Moreover, when "  p
+
p
p
  = "nb
UHH = HH + HH

(p+ ")R  I = w + B  p  "
 [p+ 2"]
+
B

= w +
B
 
p  "+ (p+ 2")
 [p+ 2"]
() UHH = w + B (p+ ")
 [p+ 2"]
To sum up, here are the CEOinformational rents when there is No Board:
ULL = w
ULH = w
UHL = w +
B
 
p  "
 [p+ 2"]
UHH =
8<: w +
B(p ")p()2
[p+2"][p p] if "  "nb
w + B(p+")[p+2"] if "  "nb
We can verify now that we have
ULL  ULH  UHL  UHH
.
When "  "nb, we need to see if pp p  1, which is true since p   p = p   p.
Subsequently, we have UHL  UHH .
When "  "nb, since p  "  p+ ", we necessarily have UHL  UHH .
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Rewriting the shareholdersexpected prots depending on those infomational rents, when there
is no board, we have:
WNB = E()  ULL    (1  )ULH   (1  ) UHL   (1  ) (1  )UHH
This gives, for "  p
+
p
p
  = "nb
WNB = E()  w  
(1  )B  p  "
 (p+ 2")
"
 p+ p
p   p
#
For "  p
+
p
p
  = "nb
WNB = E()  w   (1  ) (p+ "  p  2") B
 (p+ 2")
Proof of Proposition 2. The Participation and Incentive constraints are now:
LL + LL

pR  I  w (PCLL)
LH + LH

(p+ ")R  I  w (PCLH)
HL + HL

pR  I  w (PCHL)
HH + HH

(p+ ")R  I  w (PCHH)
HH + HH

(p+ ")R  I  HL + HL pR  I (ICHH!HL)
HH + HH

(p+ ")R  I  LH + LH (p+ ")R  I (ICHH!LH)
HH + HH

(p+ ")R  I  LL + LL pR  I (ICHH!LL)
HL + HL

pR  I  (1  ())HH + HH  p  "R  I+B	+ () (w   F )
(ICHL!HH)
HL + HL

pR  I  (1  ())LH + LH  p  "R  I+B	+ () (w   F )
(ICHL!LH)
HL + HL

pR  I  LL + LL pR  I (ICHL!LL)
LH + LH

(p+ ")R  I  HH + HH (p+ ")R  I (ICLH!HH)
LH + LH

(p+ ")R  I  HL + HL pR  I (ICLH!HL)
LH + LH

(p+ ")R  I  LL + LL pR  I (ICLH!LL)
LL + LL

pR  I  (1  ())HH + HH  p  "R  I+B	+ () (w   F )
(ICLL!HH)
LL + LL

pR  I  HL + HL pR  I (ICLL!HL)
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LL+LL

pR  I  (1  ())LH + LH  p  "R  I+B	+() (w   F ) (ICLL!LH)
We also assume that the CEO faces a limited liability constraint, i.e., even if the Board found
that the CEO has sent the wrong signal, she cannot get less than her reservation wage. This gives:
(1  ()) fw +Bg+ () (w   F )  w (LL)
, B  ()
(1  ())F
The binding constraints are:
LL + LL

pR  I = w (PCLL)
LH + LH

(p+ ")R  I = LL + LL pR  I (ICLH!LL)
= LL + LL

pR  I+ LLRp
= w + LLRp
HL + HL

pR  I = (1  ())LH + LH  p  "R  I+B	+ () (w   F ) (ICHL!LH)
= (1  ())
(
LH + LH

(p+ ")R  I
 LHR

(p+ ")    p  "+B
)
+ () (w   F )
= (1  ())w + LLRp+ LHR p   p   "   + +B	+ () (w   F )
HH + HH

(p+ ")R  I = HL + HL pR  I (ICHH!HL)
= HL + HL

pR  I+ HLRp
= (1  ())w + LLRp+ LHR p   p   "   + +B	
+() (w   F ) + HLRp
Again, in order to minimize the informational rents, shareholders will set LL; LH and HL
as low as possible while satisfying the other incentive constraints.
We now check what are the conditions due to the other Incentive constraints (and will check
later that Participation constraints are satised).
LL = 0
HH + HH

(p+ ")R  I  LL + LL pR  I (ICHH!LL)
= w + LLR

p   p = w
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LL + LL

pR  I  (1  ())LH + LH  p  "R  I+B	+ () (w   F ) =
(ICLL!LH)
(1  ())
(
w + LLRp
 LHR

(p+ ")   p  "+B
)
+ () (w   F )
, LHR

(p+ ")   p  "  B   ()
(1  ())F
, LH 
B   ()(1 ())F
R

(p+ ")   p  "
As ()(1 ())F  B  0; we have
LH =
B   ()(1 ())F
R

(p+ ")   p  "
HL + HL

pR  I  LL + LL pR  I = w + LLRp (ICHL!LL)
, (1  ())
(
LLRp
+LHR

p   p   "   + +B
)
  ()F  LLRp
, (1  ())LHR p   p   "   + +B	  ()F  0
, LH 
()
(1 ())F  B
R

p   p   "   + 
As ()(1 ())F  B  0; this is satised
HH + HH

(p+ ")R  I  LH + LH (p+ ")R  I = w + LLRp+ LHR (p+ ")
(ICHH!LH)
,
(
(1  ())w + LLRp+ LHR p   p   "   + +B	
+() (w   F ) + HLRp
)
 w + LLRp+ LHR (p+ ")
, (1  ())LHR p   p   "   + +B	+ HLRp  ()F  LHR (p+ ")
HLRp 
 
  (1  ()) p   p   "   + + (p+ ")


(p+ ")   p  "   (1  ())
!
B   ()
(1  ())F

HL 
(p+ ")   (1  ())  p  "
p
0@
h
B   ()(1 ())F
i
R

(p+ ")   p  "
1A
, HL  LH

(p+ ")  (1  ())  p  "
p
= 1HL
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LH + LH

(p+ ")R  I  HL + HL pR  I (ICLH!HL)
= HL + HL

pR  I  HLR p   p
, w + LLRp 
8>><>>:
(1  ())
(
w + LLRp
+LHR

p   p   "   + +B
)
+() (w   F )  HLR

p   p
9>>=>>;
, HLR

p   p  (1  ())LHR  p  "   (p+ ")+B	  ()F
HL 
(1  ())  p  "
p   p
0@
h
B   ()(1 ())F
i
R

(p+ ")   p  "
1A
HL 
(1  ())  p  "
p   p LH = 2HL
We can verify that
HL =
8><>:
1HL if " 
p ()p
(1 ())+ p
p
  = "ib
2HL if " 
p ()p
(1 ())+ p
p
  = "ib
Indeed, we have :
HL = 
1
HL () 1HL  2HL
()

p+ 2"+ ()
 
p  "
p
 (1  ())
 
p  "
p   p
() " (2  ())  p   p+ (1  ())p  (1  ()) pp   p+ ()p  p   p
() " p (2  ()  1 + ()) + p  (1  ())   (2  ())  pp+ ()   p  p  p  pp + pp
() " p + p  (1  ())     pp+ ()   pp
() "  p  ()p
(1  ()) + pp   
Since we have HL = 
1
HL we necessarily have " 
p ()p
(1 ())+ p
p
  ; that is to say
[(1  ())] "+ "

p
p
   

  p+ ()p  0
()
 
p  "   p   "   " p
p
   

We therefore have
(p+ ")  (1  ())  p  "   p =  p+ ()  p  " + (p+ 2")
 "   "

p
p
   

= "
p
p
 0
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And
1HL  LH
In the same way, when HL = 
2
HL we have " 
p ()p
(1 ())+ p
p
  ; that is to say
[(1  ())] "+ "

p
p
   

  p+ ()p  0
 ()  p  "   " + p  " p
p
   

We then have
(1  ())  p  "   p   p = p  "   ()  p  "
 "

p
p
   

 0
And
2HL  LH
LL + LL

pR  I  HL + HL pR  I = HL + HL pR  I  HLRp
(ICLL!HL)
, 0  (1  ())LLRp+ LHR p   p   "   + +B	  ()F   HLRp
, HLRp  (1  ())

LHR

p   p   "   + +B	  ()F
, HL 
(1  ())  p  "
p
0@
h
B   ()(1 ())F
i
R

(p+ ")   p  "
1A
, HL 
(1  ())  p  "
p
LH
Since (1  ()) p  p and since HH  LH , ICLL!HL is also satised.
Finally, we get
HL = max

1HL;
2
HL
	
=
8><>:
1HL if " 
p ()p
(1 ())+ p
p
  = "ib
2HL if " 
p ()p
(1 ())+ p
p
  = "ib
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LL + LL

pR  I  (1  ())HH + HH  p  "R  I+B	+ () (w   F ) =
(ICLL!HH)
(1  ())HH + HH (p+ ")R  I  HHR (p+ ")    p  "+B	+ () (w   F )
, w  (1  ())
(
(1  ())w + LLRp+ LHR p   p   "   + +B	
+() (w   F ) + HLRp  HHR

(p+ ")    p  "+B
)
+ () (w   F )
, 0  (1  ())
(
(1  ())LHR p   p   "   + +B	  ()F + HLRp
 HHR

(p+ ")    p  "+B
)
  ()F
, HH 
(
(1  ())LHR p   p   "   + +B	
 ()F + HLRp
)0@
h
B   ()(1 ())F
i
R

(p+ ")    p  "
1A = 1HH
HL + HL

pR  I  (1  ())HH + HH  p  "R  I+B	+ () (w   F )
(ICHL!HH)
= (1  ())
(
(1  ())w + LLRp+ LHR p   p   "   + +B	
+() (w   F ) + HLRp  HHR [p+ 2"] +B
)
+ () (w   F )
, (1  ())w + LLRp+ LHR p   p   "   + +B	+ () (w   F ) 
(1  ())
8>>>>><>>>>>:
(1  ())
8>><>>:
w + LLRp+
LHR

p   p   "   + 
+HLRp+B
9>>=>>;
+() (w   F )  HHR [p+ 2"] +B
9>>>>>=>>>>>;
+ () (w   F )
, HH 
(1  ())HLRp  ()LHR

p   p   "   + + (1  ())B   ()F
R [p+ 2"]
= 2HH
LH + LH

(p+ ")R  I  HH + HH (p+ ")R  I (ICLH!HH)
= HH + HH

(p+ ")R  I  HHR (p+ ")
, HHR (p+ ") 
(1  ())LHR

p   p   "   + 
+HLRp
+ (1  ())B   ()F
, HH 
(1  ())LHR

p   p   "   + 
+HLRp
+ (1  ())B   ()F
R (p+ ")
= 3HH
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We thus have:
LL = 0
LH =
B   ()(1 ())F
R

(p+ ")   p  "
HL =
8><>:
1HL if " 
p ()p
(1 ())+ p
p
  = "ib
2HL if " 
p ()p
(1 ())+ p
p
  = "ib
HH  max

HL;
1
HH ;
2
HH ;
3
HH
	
ULL = LL + LL

pR  I = w
ULH = LH + LH

(p+ ")R  I = w + LLRp = w
UHL = HL + HL

pR  I = (1  ())w + LLRp+ LHR p   p   "   + +B	+ () (w   F )
= w + (1  ())LHR p   p   "   + +B	  ()F
= w + (1  ())  p  "
0@
h
B   ()(1 ())F
i


(p+ ")   p  "
1A
UHH = HH + HH

(p+ ")R  I = (1  ())( w + LLRp
+LHR

p   p   "   + +B
)
+() (w   F ) + HLRp
= w + (1  ())  p  "
0@
h
B   ()(1 ())F
i


(p+ ")   p  "
1A+ HLRp
=
8>><>>:
w +
(p ")p()2[(1 ())B ()F ]
[p+2"][p p] if " 
p ()p
(1 ())+ p
p
  = "ib
w +
(p+")
h
B  ()
(1 ())F
i
[(p+") (p ")] if " 
p ()p
(1 ())+ p
p
  = "ib
To sum up, here are the CEO utilities when there is an Independant Board:
ULL = w
ULH = w
UHL = w + (1  ())
 
p  "
0@
h
B   ()(1 ())F
i


(p+ ")   p  "
1A
UHH =
8><>:
w +
(p ")p()2[(1 ())B ()F ]
[p+2"][p p] if "  "ib
w +
(p+")
h
B  ()
(1 ())F
i
[(p+") (p ")] if "  "ib
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We can verify now that we have
ULL  ULH  UHL  UHH
When "  "ib, we need to see if pp p  1, which is true since p   p = p   p.
Subsequently, we have UHL  UHH .
When "  "ib, since (1  ())
 
p  "  p+ ", we necessarily have UHL  UHH .
One can remark that types (HL) and (HH) informational rents are lower with an Independent
Board than without Board.
UHLib  UHLnb () (1  ())
 
p  "
0@
h
B   ()(1 ())F
i


(p+ ")   p  "
1A  B  p  "
 [p+ 2"]
() (1  ())

B   ()
(1  ())F

 B , which is true
Since we have "ib  "nb we only have three possible cases to consider for UHH .
"ib   "nb =
p  p
(1  ) + pp   
  p
 +
p
p   
"ib   "nb  0 ()
 
p  p + p
p
   

   p(1  ) + p
p
   

 0
()  p  p   (1  )p  p
p
   
 
p + p  p  0
()   p  p  pp
p
   

 0
() 
p
 
pp   pp   pp + pp   pp + pp  0
() 
p
 
p+ p
  
p  p  0
which is true since we have p  p  0
1. When "  "ib
UHHib   UHHnb =
 
p  " p ()2 [(1  ())B   ()F ]
 [p+ 2"]

p   p   B
 
p  " p ()2
 [p+ 2"]

p   p
sgn(UHHib   UHHnb) = sgn( () (B + F )
 
p  " ()2)  0
2. When "ib  "  "nb
UHHib   UHHnb =
(p+ ")
h
B   ()(1 ())F
i


(p+ ")   p  "   B
 
p  " p ()2
 [p+ 2"]

p   p
sgn(UHHib   UHHnb) = sgn

(p+ ")

B   ()
(1  ())F
 
p   p B  p  " p
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Since B 
h
B   ()(1 ())F
i
we need to prove that
 
p  " p  (p+ ")  p   p 
p  " p   (p+ ")  p   p = pp   pp + pp   "  p   p+ p
= p

p  "

   p
p
 + 

Since "  "nb, we have p  "

   pp + 

 0
3. When "ib  "nb  "
UHHib   UHHnb =
(p+ ")
h
B   ()(1 ())F
i


(p+ ")   p  "   B (p+ ") [p+ 2"]
Since B 
h
B   ()(1 ())F
i
we have UHHib  UHHnb .
We can now calculate the income of the shareholders. There are two cases to consider.
When "  "ib,
WIB = E()  w   w0   (1  )(1  ())(p  ")
h
B   ()(1 ())F
i
(p+ 2")
"
 + (1  ) p
p   p
#
When "  "ib,
WIB = E()  w   w0   (1  )
h
B   ()(1 ())F
i
(p+ 2")

(1  ())(p  ") + (1  )(p+ ")
Proof. We have to nd for which values of  ; the contract is collusion proof and also prove that
this bound is between 1 and 0.
1. "  "ib
WCP  WCF =  (1  )(1  ())(p  ")
h
B   ()(1 ())F
i
(p+ 2")
"
(1  ()) + (1   + ()

)
p
p   p
#
+(1  )
"
 + (1  ) p
p   p
#
B(p  ")
(p+ 2")
 0 for all  2 [1; 0]
with 0 =
p
p p for "  "ib:
Indeed,
WCP WCF =
(1  )(p  ")
(p+ 2")
 "
 + (1  ) p
p   p
#
B   [(1  ())B   ()F ]
"
(1  ()) + (1   + ()

)
p
p   p
#!
As, we have ()ED() = 1 ; this gives
WCP  WCF =
(1  )(p  ")
(p+ 2")
0BBBBB@

 + (1  ) p
p p

(B + F ) + B

2
 

B + F +B p
p p


+ (B + F ) p
p p
1CCCCCA
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This polynomial in  with a positive second degree term has 2 positive roots. If those roots are
both lower than 0; then, WCP  WCF  0 for all  2 [1; 0] :
The lowest root is
1 =


B + F +B p
p p

 
s
2

B + F +B p
p p
2
  4 (B + F ) p
p p

 + (1  ) p
p p

(B + F ) + B

2

 + (1  ) p
p p

(B + F ) + B

we have
1  0
() 4
 
p
p   p
!2 " 
 + (1  ) p
p   p
!
(B + F ) + B
#2
 4
 
B + F +B
p
p   p
!
p
p   p
" 
 + (1  ) p
p   p
!
(B + F ) + B
#
 4 (B + F ) p
p   p
" 
 + (1  ) p
p   p
!
(B + F ) + B
#
 0
() 4
 
p
p   p
!2 " 
 + (1  ) p
p   p
!
(B + F ) + B
#" 
 + (1  ) p
p   p
!
(B + F )
#
 0
which is true. WCP  WCF is therefore positive for all  2 [1; 0] :
The optimal contract is the collusion proof contract for "  "ib:
2. "ib  "  "nb
WCP  WCF =  (1  )
h
B   ()(1 ())F
i
(p+ 2")

(1  ())2(p  ") + (1   + ()

)(p+ ")

+(1  )
"
 + (1  ) p
p   p
#
B(p  ")
(p+ 2")
 0 for all  2 [1; 0]
with 0 =
p+"
p " + 1 if "  "ib:
Indeed,
WCP WCF = (1  )
(p+ 2")
 "
 + (1  ) p
p   p
#
B(p  ") +

B   ()
(1  ())F
 
(1  ())2(p  ") + (1   + ()

)(p+ ")
!
As, we have ED() = 1 ; this gives
WCP WCF =
(1  )(p  ")
(p+ 2")(   1)
0BBBBBBBB@

(1  ) p
p p   (1  )
(p+")
(p ")

B3
 

 + (1  ) p
p p

B + 2B +

 + (1  ) (p+")(p ")

(B + F )

2
 
h
B

1 + (p+")(p ")

+ 2 (B + F )
i

+ (B + F )

1 + (p+")(p ")

1CCCCCCCCA
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We are now able to show that this degree 3 polynomial, denote it P (); is negative for all
 2 [1; 0] : Indeed
@P ()
@
=
0BBBBB@
32B(1  )

p
p p  
(p+")
(p ")

+2

 

 + (1  ) p
p p

B + 2B +

 + (1  ) (p+")(p ")

(B + F )

 
h
B

1 + (p+")(p ")

+ 2 (B + F )
i
1CCCCCA
Moreover, as
"  "ib ()

 
p(0   2
  "0
p
 1
we have
2B(1  )
"
p
p   p  
(p+ ")
(p  ")
#
= B(1  )
 
p
p   p
! 

 
p(0   2
  "0
p
!
 B(1  )
 
p
p   p
!
and thus
@P ()
@

0BBBB@
3B(1  )

p
p p

+2

 

 + (1  ) p
p p

B + 2B + (1  ) (p+")(p ") (0   1) (B + F )

  [B0 + 2 (B + F )]
1CCCCA  0
()   B0 + 2 (B + F )
 + (1  ) p
p p

B + B +

 + (1  ) (p+")(p ")

(B + F )
Moreover,
B0 + 2 (B + F )
 + (1  ) p
p p

B + B +

 + (1  ) (p+")(p ")

(B + F )
 0
Hence, @P ()@ is negative for all  2 [1; 0] :
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Finally, we will show that (WCP  WCF ) (0)  0
(WCP  WCF ) (0)  0()
(1  )(p  ")
(p+ 2")0
0BBBB@

(1  ) p
p p   (1  )
(p+")
(p ")

B30
 

 + (1  ) p
p p

B + 2B +

 + (1  ) (p+")(p ")

(B + F )

20
  [B0 + 2 (B + F )] 0 +  (B + F ) 0
1CCCCA  0
()
0BBBB@

(1  ) p
p p   (1  ) (0   1)

B20
 

 + (1  ) p
p p

B + 2B + ( + (1  ) (0   1)) (B + F )

0
 B0    (B + F )
1CCCCA  0
()
0B@ B(1  ) pp p0 (0   1)

p
p p  
(p+")
(p ")

+(1  )0 (0   1)F +  (0   1) (B + F )
1CA  0
However, as
"  "nb ()
p
p   p(p  ") 
pp+

p   p p  pp
p   p   (p  ")
we have, together with p  p
p
p   p  
(p+ ")
(p  ") 
p
p   p  
(p+ ")
(p  ") 
pp+

p   p p  pp
p   p (p  ")   1  (p+ ")(p  ")  0
As

p
p p  
(p+")
(p ")

 0; (WCP  WCF ) (0) is thus positive and as @P ()@ is negative for all  2
[1; 0] ; WCP  WCF is therefore positive for all  2 [1; 0] :
The optimal contract is the collusion proof contract for "ib  "  "nb:
3. "ib  "nb  "
WCP  WCF =  (1  )
h
B   ()(1 ())F
i
(p+ 2")

(1  ())2(p  ") + (1   + ()

)(p+ ")

+(1  ) [(p+ ")  (p+ 2")] B
(p+ 2")
 0 for all  2 [1; 0]
with 0 =
p+"
p " + 1 if "  "ib:
Indeed,
WCP WCF =
(1  )(p  ")
(p+ 2")

[ + (1  ) (0   1)]B  

B   ()
(1  ())F
 
(1  ())2 + (1   + ()

) (0   1)

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As, we have ED() = 1 ; this gives
WCP  WCF =
(1  )(p  ")
(p+ 2")(   1)
0BB@
[ (2B + F ) + (1  ) (0   1)F ] 2
  [B0 + 2 (B + F )] 
+ (B + F ) 0
1CCA
This polynomial in  with a positive second degree term has 2 positive roots. If those roots are
both lower than 0; then, WCP  WCF  0 for all  2 [1; 0] :
The lowest root is
1 =
 [B0 + 2 (B + F )] 
q
2 [B0 + 2 (B + F )]
2   4 (B + F ) 0 [ (2B + F ) + (1  ) (0   1)F ]
2 [ (2B + F ) + (1  ) (0   1)F ]
we have
1  0
() 420 [ (2B + F ) + (1  ) (0   1)F ]2   40 [B0 + (B + F )] [ (2B + F ) + (1  ) (0   1)F ]  0
() 40 (0   1) [ (2B + F ) + (1  ) (0   1)F ] [ (B + F ) + (1  )0F ]  0
which is true. WCP  WCF is therefore positive for all  2 [1; 0] :
The optimal contract is the collusion proof contract for "ib  "nb  ":
Proof of Lemma 1. Maximizing WCB() is equivalent to
When "  b";
WCB() =
8>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>:
  1
( 1)2 [(   1)B   F ]
"
(   1)2(p  ")
+((1  ) 2 + )(p+ ")
#
if   b
  1
3
[(   1)B   F ]
24 (   1)
+((1  ) 2 + ) p
p p
35 if b    0
  1 [(   1)B   F ]

 + (1  ) p
p p

if   0
When "  b";
WCB() =
8>><>>:
  1
( 1)2 [(   1)B   F ]
"
 (   1)2 (p  ")
+((1  ) 2 + )(p+ ")
#
if   0
  1 [(   1)B   F ]

(   1)(p  ") + (1  )(p+ ") if   0
When "  b";
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Iif   b
@WCB()
@
=  
2666664
 
B
"
(   1)2(p  ")
+((1  ) 2 + )(p+ ")
#
+ [(   1)B   F ]
"
2(   1)(p  ")
+2 (1  ) (p+ ")
#!
(   1) 2
  [(   1)B   F ]
"
(   1)2(p  ")
+((1  ) 2 + )(p+ ")
#  
2 (   1)  + 2
3777775
(   1)2 4
=  
2664
 
B
"
(   1)2(p  ")
+((1  ) 2 + )(p+ ")
#
(   1) 2 + [(   1)B   F ] (1  ) 4(p+ ")!
  [(   1)B   F ] (p+ ") (   1)
3775
(   1)2 4
=  
" 
B
"
(   1)2(p  ")
+((1  ) 2 + )(p+ ")
#
(   1)  + [(   1)B   F ] (p+ ") (1  ) 3    (   1)!#
(   1)2 4
=  
 
B
"
(   1)3(p  ")
+ (1  ) 3 (2   1) (p+ ")
#
  [B + F ] (p+ ") (1  ) 3    (   1)!
(   1)2 4
=  
 
B

(   1)3(p  ") + 2 (1  ) 3 (   1) (p+ ")
+ [B + F ] (p+ ") (   1)  F (p+ ") (1  ) 3
!
(   1)2 4
=  
 
B

(   1)3(p  ") + (1  ) 3 (   1) (p+ ")
+ [B + F ] (p+ ") (   1) + (p+ ") (1  ) 3 [(   1)B   F ]
!
(   1)2 4
if b    0
@WCB()
@
=   1
3
[(   1)B   F ]
24 (   1)
+((1  ) 2 + ) p
p p
35
=  
B3
24 (   1)
+((1  ) 2 + ) p
p p
35+ [(   1)B   F ] 3    (   1) 3   (1  ) 4 +  p
p p

6
=  
B

4 +  (   1)2 3 +   2   1 p
p p

+ [B + F ]

 (   1) 3 + (1  ) 4 +  p
p p

  3 [B + F ]
6
=  
B

 (   1)2 3 +   2   1 p
p p

+ [B + F ]

 (   1) 3 + (1  ) 4 +  p
p p

+ 3 [(   1)B   F ]
6
 0
35
If   0
@WCB()
@
=   [B   (   1)B + F ]
2
"
 + (1  ) p
p   p
#
=   [B + F ]
2
"
 + (1  ) p
p   p
#
 0 if   0
When "  b";
if   0
@WCB()
@
=   1
(   1) 2 [(   1)B   F ]
"
 (   1)2 (p  ")
+((1  ) 2 + )(p+ ")
#
if   0
@WCB()
@
=  
"

 
B

(   1)(p  ") + (1  )(p+ ")+ [(   1)B   F ] (p  ")
  [(   1)B   F ] (   1)(p  ") + (1  )(p+ ")
#

=  
"
 [(   1)B   F ] (p  ")
+ [B + F ]

(   1)(p  ") + (1  )(p+ ")
#

 0
Proof. As WCB() is non increasing on each interval, we have to compare its value for the lower
bound of each interval5.
When "  b";
WCB(min) WCB(b) =
 

B   1
min   1F
24 ( min 1min )2
+(1   + 
2min
) (p+")(p ")
35+ B   1b   1F
24 (b 1b )2
+(1   + b2 )(b 1b ) pp p
35
WCB(min) WCB(0) =
 

B   1
min   1F
24 ( min 1min )2
+(1   + 
2min
) (p+")(p ")
35+ B   1
0   1F
24 ( 0 10 )2
+(1  )( 0 10 )
p
p p
35
WCB(b) WCB(0) =
 

B   1b   1F
24 (b 1b )2
+(1   + b2 )(b 1b ) pp p
35+ B   1
0   1F
24 ( 0 10 )2
+(1  )( 0 10 )
p
p p
35
5Assuming that min is such that
h
B   1
min 1F
i
= K > 0:
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When "  b";
WCB(min) WCB(0) =
 

B   1
min   1F
24 ( min 1min )2
+(1   + 
2min
) (p+")(p ")
35+ B   1
0   1F
 
(
0   1
0
) + (1  )(p+ ")
(p  ")

For each case, replacing min; 0; b by  ; the value of those di¤erences is negative. This means
that the rst term is lower than the second one6. However, when the di¤erence between the  0s
increases, the rst term becomes higher than the second one. Thus, depending on the length of this
interval, we can nd the optimal  :
Lets check what happens when the shareholders set F optimally in order to maximize their
prots, i.e. such that
h
B   1 1F
i
= K:
When "  b";
WCB(min) WCB(b) =
 
24 ( min 1min )2
+(1   + 
2min
) (p+")(p ")
35+
24 (b 1b )2
+(1   + b2 )(b 1b ) pp p
35  0
()  
24 b2(2min   2min + 1)
+((1  ) 2minb2 + b2) (p+")(p ")
35+
24 2min(b2   2b + 1)
+((1  )b2 + )2min(b 1b ) pp p
35  0
()  
24 b2( 2min + 1)
+b2 (p+")(p ")
35+ 2min
264 (1  )b2

(b 1b ) pp p   (p+")(p ")

+(b 1b ) pp p   2b + 
375  0
Moreover as
b = pp p
p
p p  
(p+")
(p ")
() (b   1b ) pp   p   (p+ ")(p  ") = 0
We have
2minb2   b2(p+ ")
(p  ") + 1

+ 2min
"
(
b   1b ) pp   p   2b + 1
#
 0
Using the fact that for   b ; we have 0 = (p+")(p ") + 1; this gives
2minb2   b20 + 2min [0   2b ]  0
6For instance, for the case WCB(min) WCB(0) we have:
(1  )(   1)p(p  ")  ((1  )  + 

)(p+ ")

p   p
= (1  ) p(p  ")  (p+ ") p   p 2   (1  )p(p  ")   (p+ ") p   p
= (1  )
"
p
p   p   (p+ ")(p  ")
#
2   (1  ) p
p   p    (p+ ")(p  ")
This is a polynomial of degree with only one positive root which is lower than 0 (indeed, it is negative in 0)
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This polynomial in min has 2 roots : min = b and min =  b[0 2b ] : Using this, we can conclude
that it is therefore negative for all min  b :
WCB(min) WCB(0)
=  
24 ( min 1min )2
+(1   + 
2min
) (p+")(p ")
35+
24 ( 0 10 )2
+(1  )( 0 10 )
p
p p
35
=  
24 20(2min   2min + 1)
+((1  ) 2min20 + 20) (p+")(p ")
35+
24 2min(20   20 + 1)
+ (1  ) 2min(20   0) pp p
35
= 2min
0@ (20   20 + 1)
+ (1  ) (20   0) pp p
  20   (1  ) 20
(p+ ")
(p  ")
1A+ 220min   20(p+ ")(p  ") + 1

 0
2min
 
   0
"
(1  ) p
p   p + 2
#
+ (1  ) 20
 
p
p   p  
(p+ ")
(p  ")
!!
+ 220min   20

(p+ ")
(p  ") + 1

 0
20
 
(1  )
 
p
p   p  
(p+ ")
(p  ")
!
2min + 2min   

(p+ ")
(p  ") + 1
!
  2min
"
(1  ) p
p   p + 2
#
0 +   0
The coe¢ cient of the degree 2 term is negative for low values of min and positive for high values
of min: Indeed, it is a degree 2 polynomial in min; with only a positive root, min which is lower
than 0 :
 2 +
s
42 + 4 (1  )

p
p p  
(p+")
(p ")

(p+")
(p ") + 1

2 (1  )

p
p p  
(p+")
(p ")
  0 =  p
p   p
!
4 (1  )
 
p
p   p  
(p+ ")
(p  ")
! 
2
p
p   p  
(p+ ")
(p  ")   1
!
+ 4 (1  )2
 
p
p   p
!2 
p
p   p  
(p+ ")
(p  ")
!2
 0
When min  min; WCB(min) WCB(0) is a concave second degree polynomial in 0 with only
one positive root. As it is negative for 0 = min; WCB(min) WCB(0)  0 for all 0  min:
When min  min; WCB(min) WCB(0) is a convex second degree polynomial in 0 with two
positive roots (denote teh highest root 0). As it is negative for 0 = min; WCB(min) WCB(0) 
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0 for all min  0  0 and WCB(min) WCB(0)  0 for all 0  0:
WCB(b) WCB(0)
 
24 (b 1b )2
+(1   + b2 )(b 1b ) pp p
35+
24 ( 0 10 )2
+(1  )( 0 10 )
p
p p
35
=  
24 20(b2   2b + 1)
+20((1  )b2 + ) (p+")(p ")
35+
24 b2(20   20 + 1)
+(1  )b2(20   0) pp p
35
= 20
"
((1  )b2 " p
p   p  
(p+ ")
(p  ")
#
+ (2b   (p+ ")
(p  ")   1)
#
 
"
(1  )b2 p
p   p + 2b2
#
0 + b2
= b2 "((1  ) 20
"
p
p   p  
(p+ ")
(p  ")
#
  (1  ) p
p   p0   20 + 
#
+ 220b   30
When the degree 2 coe¢ cient of this polynomial is positive, there is only one positive root and
as it is negative for b = 0; WCB(b) WCB(0)  0 for all b  0:
However, when this degree 2 coe¢ cient is negative, there is two positive roots. As WCB(b)  
WCB(0)  0 for b = 0; and @(WCB(b) WCB(0))@b (0)  0; we also have WCB(b)  WCB(0)  0
for all b  0:
When "  b";
WCB(min) WCB(0)  0
()  

(
min   1
min
)2 +

2min
(p+ ")
(p  ")

+ (
0   1
0
)  0
()  0
 
2min   2min + 1
  20 + 0 + 2min(0   1)  0
() 20min   20   2min  0
()

0
min
2
  2 0
min
+ 1  0
We therefore have WCB(min) WCB(0) when "  b".
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